Protection of Conscience
Project
Media Commentary: April -
June, 2001
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Protection of Conscience
Project |
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Letter
to the Editor, I still don't get it. How can those who stand for the "right of women to make their own decisions" at the same time argue that a doctor, nurse, or pharmacist should be legally coerced into performing an act that violates her most deeply-held beliefs? ["Unconscionable Care", Emily Bass, June/July 2001] The article minimizes this contradiction by contending that it's somehow wrong to talk of an "institutional" right of conscience for organizations like Catholic hospitals. But the law grants such "individual" rights to institutions all the time, whether it be the free speech rights of Ms. or the free exercise rights of the local synagogue. Instead of asking these hospitals to check their beliefs at the door, we should applaud them for often being willing to serve communities that other health care providers have abandoned. Needless to say, such hospitals are more likely to reduce the services they provide rather than contravene their faith by, for instance, performing abortions or aiding those who do. The result: underprivileged communities receiving even less health care than they do today. Rather than deal with these hard questions, Ms. Bass presents a Good vs. Evil smackdown pitting the "right to health care" against "so-called" rights of conscience. But the right to receive a particular medical procedure does not include the right to force another to perform that procedure against her will. The logic of personal autonomy grounds the reproductive health care rights Ms. Bass supports so strongly, and it hasn't changed simply because HMO's have replaced house calls. Adherents of this logic should recognize that it cuts both ways, protecting those whose beliefs prevent them from providing certain medical services as much as those who seek such services out. Kim
Daniels
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PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT www.consciencelaws.org |
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| ADVISORY BOARD J. Budziszewski, Ph.d Dr. John Fleming, Dr. Henk Jochemsen, Ph.d David Novak, Lynn D. Wardle, J.D. PROJECT TEAM Michael Markwick
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The Editor, Dear Mr. Reinboldt: Further to our e-mail exchange of 24 May, 2001, I am writing to thank you for your editorial response to my criticism of Frank Archer’s opinion piece in the Journal last year. With your permission, the editorial has been posted on the Project website. While I disagree that Mr. Archer’s statements about the position of conscientious objectors were purely speculative, I am grateful that the Journal has acknowledged concerns about the column. Readers may now realize that there is no evidence to support blanket allegations that conscientious objectors mislead patients or otherwise act dishonestly, and that it would be a mistake to draw that conclusion from Mr. Archer’s article. I appreciate your efforts to maintain a balanced editorial position in a contentious debate. Sincerely, Sean Murphy,
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PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT www.consciencelaws.org |
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| ADVISORY BOARD J. Budziszewski, Ph.d Dr. John Fleming, Dr. Henk Jochemsen, Ph.d David Novak, Lynn D. Wardle, J.D. PROJECT TEAM Michael Markwick
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14 June, 2001 Dear Sir/Madam: Readers might be confused by Susan Martinuk’s quote from the College of Pharmacists about what the future may hold for the profession: "preparation of drugs to assist voluntary or involuntary suicide, cloning, genetic manipulation or even suicide." (Customer isn't always right on issues of conscience, The Province, 13 June, 2001). The College Registrar has explained that "involuntary suicide" should have read "involuntary euthanasia", a clarification that hardly diminishes the moral issues that arise when people are killed without their consent. The second reference to suicide in the same quote is an error in Ms. Martinuk’s article. The sentence in the College statement ended, "...or even execution". The reference is to the participation of pharmacists in execution by lethal injection, as in the case of Timothy McVeigh. The paper quoted by Ms. Martinuk was written by the Ethics Advisory Committee of the College, and included imputations of dishonesty directed against conscientious objectors within the profession which the College is unable to substantiate, but which it refuses to withdraw. It is difficult to see how this is consistent with justice nor non-maleficence, two ethical principles that are supposed to be upheld by ethics committees. Sincerely, Sean Murphy,
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PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT www.consciencelaws.org |
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| ADVISORY BOARD J. Budziszewski, Ph.d Dr. John Fleming, Dr. Henk Jochemsen, Ph.d David Novak, Lynn D. Wardle, J.D. PROJECT TEAM Michael Markwick
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The Editor, Dear Sir/Madam: An article about a bill in the Wisconsin legislature (Megan Mulholland, Conscience bill offers no easy answers, 30 April, 2001) concludes with the observation that it raises tough questions but "no easy answers." Protection of conscience laws acknowledge the existence of serious moral disagreements. They ensure that dissenting minorities are not driven from their jobs, professions or homes in order to secure the hegemony of a dominant moral viewpoint. Disagreements must not be overcome by coercion, harassment and discrimination, but by rational argument and honest dialogue. However, productive dialogue demands attention to language. Note, for example, how objectors’ beliefs are said to "interfere" with their "duties". Since there can be no duty to do what is wrong, an assertion that a health care worker has a "duty" to provide something clearly derives from an a priori assumption about the very point in dispute. This is what leads to the accusation of ‘interference’ - a pejorative term.. Of equal moment is the description of objectors’ beliefs as "personal" or "private", the connotation being that dissenters are moral eccentrics whose opinions can be set aside by majority rule. In fact, their beliefs are often held in common with hundreds of thousands or even millions of others, particularly in the case of the great religious traditions. From this perspective, the term "private" may more accurately describe a professional code of ethics than the beliefs of conscientious objectors. Finally, laws that prohibit murder, rape, theft and perjury and laws that mandate alimony and child support demonstrate that morality often is imposed by legislation. Nonetheless, protection of conscience laws neither imply nor impose a moral judgement about medical procedures. They insist only that citizens should be free to serve their communities in accordance with their fundamental convictions. Sincerely, Sean Murphy,
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Editorial- April 2001 Back in August, in the thick of our series on emergency contraception, Sean Murphy, administrator of a group called the Protection of Conscience Project, sent us a letter criticizing a column we published by Frank Archer, a member of the BC College of Pharmacists ethics committee. Said Mr. Murphy: "In his May column (Mr. Archer said) that conscientious objectors believe they are entitled to lie to mislead patients, and that they wish to obtain patient consent by dishonest means." He asked us "to provide evidence to substantiate the accusations, or print a retraction and apology for having published them." At the risk of revisiting an offending passage -- but in the interest of fairness here's what Mr. Archer wrote in May: "A third concern is that pharmacists should be able to deny certain legitimate pharmacy services exist, if requested to provide them, or at least to be able to attempt to dissuade such patients, under the guise of patient counselling, by stating religious or moral beliefs as if they were scientific facts. This establishes that lying is justified if pharmacists object to providing contentious services." To me, Mr. Archer's comments are not the stuff of apologies and retractions. Important in this example, the article -- an opinion piece -- appeared early in the EC debate and was meant to establish and comment on possible scenarios in the pharmacy. That's shown when Mr. Archer writes that "pharmacists should be able to" deny services, or "be able to attempt" to dissuade patients from trying EC. He does not claim that some pharmacists "do" deny that EC exists, or "do" counsel patients by stating religious or moral beliefs. Instead, he was covering the bases in what was a fairly exhaustive review. Having said all that, proofreaders will argue that the CPJ confused matters by neglecting the sentence, "this establishes that lying is justified...'. And they would be right. It should have read "this would establish," to agree with the rest of the paragraph. For some, that explanation probably won't do. Emergency contraception is an emotional subject, and pharmacists on both sides have been rigorous in defending their arguments. Mr. Murphy will have to decide if our response is fair, and I suspect he will share his conclusions. Which leads us to another article -a letter, actually - that might offer some perspective. Consider this passage from our May, 2000, issue: "I am very sorry, but just because a treatment is legal, it does not therefore automatically make it moral. Hitler also legalized mercy killing." By publishing that argument, is the CPJ equating some health professionals with amoral Nazi butchers? No, of course not. But we won't apologize or retract that comment either. [Cross ref: Report 2001-01 // In Defence of the New Heretics: A Response to Frank Archer // "Autonomy" "Justice" and the Legal Requirement to Accommodate the Conscience and Religious Beliefs of Professionals in Health Care // Letter to the Editor (Pharmacy Practice) // Letter to the Editor (Canadian Pharmaceutical Journal). - Administrator -] |
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