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Introduction:
After her attempts to have the law
against assisted suicide set aside by lower courts failed, Sue Rodriguez appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada. While the Supreme Court narrowly dismissed her appeal
(5-4), Chief Justice Antonio Lamer (dissenting) expressed the opinion that assisted
suicide should be available to all, not just to those terminally ill and near death, and
that everyone should be entitled to assistance in committing suicide.Inferences about the moral environment in Canada may be
drawn from the fact that the Rodriguez' appeals were dismissed at each level by such
narrow margins, and that the Chief Justices of British Columbia and of Canada supported
her position. Those who object to euthanasia or assisted suicide have cause for
concern that a judge of Lamer's stature believed that assistance to commit suicide was
owed to Rodriguez.
Rodriguez was later killed in the presence of Canadian Member of Parliament Svend Robinson
with an injection said to have been provided by an unidentified physician.
Re: Rodriguez and Attorney General of
British Columbia et al
Supreme Court of Canada, 30 September, 1993:
Court File 23476
107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 15, 20 W.C.B. (2d) 589
SUMMARY:
The appellant is terminally ill, suffering from a progressive disease of the motor
neurons. There is no cure for the disease and the average duration of life is about
three years. Evidence indicated that the appellant would become bedridden and unable
to speak or to care for herself. The disease does not usually affect the mind of the
patient. The appellant sought a declaration to the effect that she was entitled to
have assistance in committing suicide when her condition becomes no longer bearable.
By that time, she would be unable to commit suicide without the assistance of another
person. Section 241(b) of the Criminal Code makes it an offence for anyone to aid or
abet a person to commit suicide. . .
Lamer, C.J.C. (dissenting)
. . .The constitutional exemption I propose would be available only on the authority of a
superior court order, granted on terms similar to those outlined by McEachern, C.J.B.C. .
. . However, I would make an important change to the order he would have granted in
this appeal.
I have held that S. 241(b) violates the
equality rights of all persons who desire to commit suicide but are or will become
physically unable to do so unassisted. Restricting the remedy to those who are
terminally ill, and suffering from incurable diseases or conditions, as McEachern,
C.J.B.C. would have, does not follow from the principles underlying my holding, and might
well itself give rise to a violation of the equality rights of those who do not fit that
description but wish to commit suicide and need assistance. Therefore, I would
eliminate that part of McEachern C.J.B.C.'s conditions for a court order granting the
constitutional exemption [i.e., that the patient be "terminally ill and near death,
and that there is no hope of recovering" - Ed.].
There is another aspect of McEachern
C.J.B.C.'s order that has caused me concern. One of McEachern C.J.B.C.'s conditions
is that the act of terminating the appellant's life be hers and not anyone else's.
While I believe this to be appropriate in her current circumstances as a mechanism can be
put in place allowing her to cause her own death with her limited physical capabilities,
why should she be prevented the option of choosing suicide should her physical condition
degenerate to the point where she is no longer even physically able to press a button or
blow into a tube? Surely, it is in such circumstances that assistance is required
most. Given that Ms. Rodriguez has not requested such an order, however, I need not
decide the issue at this time. Therefore, I prefer to leave it to be resolved at a
later date. . .
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