The New Inquisitors
Sean Murphy
*Administrator, Protection of Conscience Project
Introduction
The
College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario is the regulatory and licensing authority for physicians and
surgeons practising in Ontario. In February, 2008, the
Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC)
responded to a draft policy of the College a with a submission recommending that
the exercise of freedom of conscience by physicians be restricted.
1
The College, in response, released a draft policy
“Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code", indicating that Ontario
physicians will be expected to sacrifice their freedom of conscience to meet the
demands of their patients and avoid prosecution by Ontario's human rights
apparatus.
2
According to the College, the
Ontario
Human Rights Tribunal may take action against a physician who refuses to
provide or refer for procedures that he finds morally objectionable. In addition
to the possibility of prosecution by the Tribunal, the College states that it
will consider the
Human Rights Code in adjudicating complaints of
professional misconduct. The College’s draft policy also suggests that the
College plans to force objecting physicians to actively assist patients to
obtain morally controversial services.
The Ontario Human Rights Commission has since commented further on the College’s
proposals,
3 and the tenor of its submission makes
clear that the OHRC and related agencies pose a significant threat to the
exercise of freedom of conscience by health care professionals. This article
provides basic information about the structure and powers of these agencies in
Ontario, which exist in one form or another in every Canadian province.
The Ontario Human Rights Commission
The
Ontario Human Rights Commission is a
branch of a tripartite inquisitorial system established in the province
ostensibly to "help promote and advance human rights."
4
The legal authority and powers of the Commission are set out in Part III of the
Ontario Human Rights Code (hereinafter “the
Code”).
5
The Commission is authorized, in addition to other regulatory functions, to
develop public education programmes, research discriminatory practices, review
statutes and regulations to ensure compliance with the
Code, and assist
individuals and groups to develop anti-discrimination programmes.
6
It can also issue policies “to provide guidance” in applying the
Code,
7
a power that allows it to direct the personal and professional conduct of
individuals and institutions, backed by an implied threat of prosecution for
failure to adhere to the Commission’s ‘guidance.’
Further, the Commission can initiate "inquiries" (investigations), not of
wrongdoing or unlawful conduct, but of “incidents of tension or conflict” or
“conditions” that may lead to such incidents.
8
Presumably, the “incidents” or “conditions” must be related to alleged or
potential contraventions of the
Code, but the Commission’s investigative
mandate is, in law, limited only by its resources and the imagination and
ambitions of its members.
OHRC agents have broad powers to enter private property
without warrant,
and can,
without warrant, search premises, examine, measure, photograph
the area and and seize they think relevant to the investigation.
9
Moreover, the
Code imposes a duty on everyone - accused persons included
- to comply with their demands to produce any document or thing, and to assist
them in using computers or other data storage systems for this purpose.
10
In the event of non-compliance, interference or obstruction, a warrant to search
or do anything specified in the warrant can be obtained for any place, including
a dwelling house,
11 and police can be called upon
to assist, using force if need be.
12
All of this for the purpose of investigating, not unlawful conduct, but mere
“tension or conflict,” or conditions that might lead to either. In contrast,
Canadian police have far less power to investigate criminal offences - including
murder.
In chasing down sources of potential tension or conflict, OHRC agents can
interrogate any person, and may exclude anyone from the interrogation they deem
"adverse” to their investigation, though they may not exclude legal counsel.
13
For the purpose of resolving tension or conflict or conditions conducive to
either, the Commission is authorized to make recommendations and encourage
remedial or preventive measures.
14 It is not
authorized to enforce its policies or recommendations, but it can apply to the
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal to issue an order if it believes that “a right to
equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities” has been
“infringed.”
15 In addition, with the permission of
a party who has made an application, it may intervene in a case before the
Tribunal.
16The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal The
Tribunal can be considered the
inquisition proper, since, as will be seen presently, it exercises both
investigative and judicial powers. It is an entity established by Part IV of the
Code. Members of the Tribunal need not be learned in law or ethics. All
that is required is that they have "experience, knowledge or training with
respect to human rights law and issues," have ‘aptitudes’ for impartiality and
“alternative adjudicative practices and procedures,” and be selected through
some form of competitive process.
17
While the Tribunal is distinct from the Commission, it would be incorrect - even
naive - to see in this distinction a separation of powers designed to protect
civil liberties. The powers of the Commission and the Tribunal are not separate
in the way that the powers of the legislature and judiciary are separate. They
are not like different weights, opposed and in balance, on the left and right
trays of the scale of justice. The Commission and Tribunal are separate as the
left and right arms of a wrestler are separate, or the left and right flanks of
an army.
Thus, though the Commission must apply to the Tribunal to obtain an order to
enforce its recommendations, it can force the Tribunal to consider Commission
policies that explain how the Code is to be applied when deciding whether or not
to issue an order.
18 Nothing prevents the
Commission from writing a policy tailor-made for a case it plans to bring to the
Tribunal to ensure that the Tribunal will reach the ‘correct’ conclusion.
Like the Commission, the Tribunal can conduct an inquiry (investigation), but it
can only begin an inquiry if asked to do so if there is an allegation by the
Commission or an individual that a right has been infringed.
19
Though concept of “infringement” is infinitely more plastic than
violation, the Tribunal cannot investigate mere “incidents of tension and
conflict.” It can, however, ask the Commission to do so.
20
Tribunal agents have the same powers of search, seizure and interrogation as
Commission investigators. Ultimately, they submit their reports to the Tribunal.
21
Whether or not there is a preliminary investigation, the Tribunal must determine
whether or not to make the order sought by an applicant, and, for this purpose,
it is authorized to determine all questions of fact or law.
22
While it cannot rule on an application without affording the parties an
opportunity to make oral submissions, and it must provide written reasons for
its decision,
23 the Tribunal is otherwise free to
make up its own rules and procedures.
24
It can - but need not - adhere to the
Statutory Powers Procedure Act,
25
which regulates the operation of other quasi-judicial tribunals like the
disciplinary committees of the Law Society or College of Physicians and
Surgeons.
26 It can conduct hearings in the
adversarial style customary in common law jurisdictions, but may also use
“alternatives to traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures,”
27
and there is no requirement that the alternatives be acceptable to the accused.
Most remarkable, having made up its own rules, the Tribunal is not necessarily
required to follow them.
28
Acting as an inquisition, Tribunal panels can hold hearings for the combined
purpose of investigation and adjudication. The Tribunal is empowered to demand
the production of witnesses or evidence from any party to the proceeding,
including the accused,
29 and can examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
30
Tribunal orders
If the Tribunal finds that a right has been “infringed,” it can order the
payment of compensation and/or restitution for "for injury to dignity, feelings
and self-respect,"
31 and can order the accused to
do anything that the Tribunal believes will "promote compliance" with the
Code. There is no limit to the amount of monetary compensation or
restitution that may be ordered, or upon what the Tribunal might order done.
32
Equally important, compensation payments can be ordered even if an accused
establishes that his actions were legally justified. This is because human
rights tribunals typically follow a two-stage process, first determining whether
or not discrimination has occurred, and then (if it has) whether or not the
discrimination can be reasonably justified. A finding that the discrimination
was justified does not negate the finding that discrimination occurred, so even
an accused who succeeds in establishing that he acted reasonably can be forced
to pay unlimited sums in compensation, or made to do anything ordered by the
Tribunal.
33
Appeals
In the event that the Tribunal does not correctly apply a Commission policy, the
Commission can ask the Tribunal to have the case reviewed by the divisional
court, but only with respect to points of law, not findings of fact.
34
It appears that the court cannot set aside the order by the Tribunal even if it
made an error in law, though parties to the proceeding can plead with the
Tribunal to reconsider its decision in light of the court ruling.
35
It is by no means clear that the Tribunal is bound to conform to the decision of
the court.
Finally, though the Tribunal can be asked to reconsider a decision,
36
its decisions cannot be appealed "unless the decision is patently unreasonable."
37
What might be considered “patently unreasonable” is difficult to predict. For
example: under the previous human rights regime, a Christian printer, for
reasons of conscience, refused to print materials for an organization that
promotes homosexual lifestyles and posts pro-paedophilia literature on the
internet. An Ontario human rights panel fined him $5,000.00 and ordered him to
provide services for "lesbians and gays and to organizations in existence for
their benefit." On appeal, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruled that he
could decline to print materials in direct conflict with “core elements” of his
beliefs. But the court upheld the conviction and the $5,000.00 fine.
38
Finally, the Ontario Court of Appeal saddled him with $40,000.00 in court costs.
Quite apart from court costs, his legal fees amounted to almost $100,000.00.
39
So, in the eyes of Ontario judges, it is not patently unreasonable to fine a
Christian printer who does not want to support the celebration of homosexual
lifestyles, and to burden him with $140,000.00 debt for daring to assert and
defend his freedom of conscience and religion.
Enforcement
In the end, neither the Ontario Human Rights Commission nor the Tribunal can
directly enforce Tribunal orders. Instead, like the inquisitions of the Catholic
Church in mediaeval times, which turned relapsed heretics over to the secular
arm for the punishment prescribed by law, defaulters are referred to the
Attorney General, who must authorize their prosecution in a regular provincial
court. If they are found there to have failed to comply with an order of the
Tribunal, they can be fined up to $25,000.00.
40
The Ontario Human Rights Legal Support Centre
The Ontario legal and political establishment is not unaware of the costs
involved in human rights proceedings. Thus, Part IV.I of the
Code
authorizes the creation of the
Human Rights Legal Support Centre, the third arm of Ontario’s tripartite
human rights inquisition. It is to provide legal services at public expense for
those who make complaints to the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. This ensures
that, win or lose, aggrieved parties can seek orders, compensation and
restitution without having to pay any of the costs involved. In addition, the
Commission may intervene in a case to support a complainant, thus bringing its
considerable legal and financial resources to bear against an accused.
41
Accused persons - like the hapless Christian printer - are not similarly
supported. In addition to indirect costs like the loss of income or wages
associated with the need to consult counsel and attend legal proceedings, they
must pay for their own lawyers, so that, even if they win the case, they may be
saddled with significant legal bills.
Notes
1.
Submission of
the Ontario Human Rights Commission to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario regarding the draft policies relating to establishing and ending
physician-patient relationships. 14 February, 2008. Accessed 2008-08-31
2. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario,
Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code, Accessed 2008-08-14.
3.
Submission of
the Ontario Human Rights Commission to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario Regarding the draft policy, "Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights
Code.” 15 August, 2008. Accessed 3008-08-31
4. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General,
Human Rights in Ontario. Accessed 2008-08-27
5.
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, Chap, H19. (hereinafter "Code")
Accessed 2008-08-27
6. Code, Section
29(b), (c), (d), (f)
7. Code, Section
30
8. Code, Sections
29(e),
31(1)
9. Code, Section
31(4) to (6)
10. Code, Section
31(11)
11. Code, Section
31.1(1)
12. Code, Section
31.1(7)
13. Code, Section
31(7)c
14. Code, Section
29(e)
15. Code, Sections
29(i),
35
16. Code, Section
37. An applicant is hardly likely to refuse permission for a supportive
intervention from an ally who governs the application of the Code.
17. Code, Section
32(3)
18. The Tribunal may consider Commission policies at
any time [Code Section
45.5(1)], but it must to do so when a party to an application - including
the Commission - so requests. [Code Section
45.5 (2)].
19. Code, Sections
34,
35
20. Code, Section
44
21. Code, Section
44(14)
22. Code, Section
39
23. Code, Section
43(2)
24. Code, Sections
40,
43
25.
Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 . Accessed 2008-08-29
26. Code, Section
42
27. Code, Section
43(3)
28. Code, Section
43(8)
29. Code, Section
43(3)f
30. Code, Section
43(3)c
31. Code, Section
45.2(1)
32. Code, Section
45.2(2)
33. This is exemplified by the decision of the
BC Human Rights Tribunal that ordered the
Knights of Columbus, a Catholic men’s organization, to pay damages to a lesbian
couple for refusing to rent its hall for their ‘wedding’ reception. The BC
Tribunal applied a comparable section of the BC Human Rights Code [Section
37(2)(d) iii)] to impose the damages. Accessed 2008-08-29. Smith and
Chymyshyn v. Knights of Columbus and others, 2005 BCHRT 544.
Accessed 2008-08-30. CTV News,
B.C. tribunal awards lesbian couple damages (30 Nov. 2005). Accessed 30
August, 2008
34. Code, Section
45.6(1), (2)
35. Code, Section
45.6(7)
36. Code, Section
45.7
37. Code, Section
45.8.
38. Murphy, Sean,
Of Printers and Press Gangs.
Catholic Civil Rights League. Accessed 2008-08-30
39. Gosgnach, Tony,
“Scott Brockie
saddled with debt.” The Interim, June, 2004. Accessed 2008-08-30
40. Code, Section
46.2
41. Code, Section
37