Ethical Method in Christian Bioethics: Mapping the Terrain
	The Center for Bioethics and 
	Human Dignity, 5 August, 2003
	Reproduced with permission
				
				
	
	Bioethical-and especially 
							biotechnological-developments are both so urgent and 
							have come so quickly upon us that there has been 
							little time for Christian bioethicists to reflect 
							upon or develop a coherent methodological approach. 
							However, our answers to particular questions-e.g., 
							what should we think and say about nanotechnology or 
							germ-line genetic intervention or cryopreservation 
							or any other issue-demand reflection on a prior 
							methodological question: How should a Christian 
							go about discerning a reliable answer to such 
							ethical questions? I would here like to offer a 
							very preliminary analysis of patterns of ethical 
							methodology among Christians weighing in on 
							contemporary biotechnology debates.
							Obviously, the question of method comes into play 
							every time a scholar undertakes any intellectual 
							project. Unfortunately, fixation on disputes about 
							method often mars academia, at times making it 
							impossible for scholars ever to take a substantive 
							stance about anything. Especially because I have 
							always understood my work as an ethicist to be in 
							service to the church, I have avoided extensive 
							methodological tangles whenever I can. The people in 
							the pew do not care as much about the ethical method 
							that is used as they do about the normative moral 
							guidance that is offered on the issues of the day. 
							Contemporary biotechnology concerns, however, raise 
							methodological issues that cannot responsibly be 
							avoided. When we fail to do such methodological 
							reflection, but pronounce in an ad hoc fashion on 
							biotech issues anyway, the flimsiness of our 
							thinking is quickly 
revealed.
1 
							This is no mere professional 
faux pas but 
							instead a damaging setback for Christians speaking 
							in the public arena on the most critical issues of 
							our time. It will quickly marginalize our voices in 
							a public ethical conversation that we may only have 
							one chance to participate in before some of these 
							issues are decided.
Evangelical Bioethics and the 
							Use of Scripture
	The question of bioethical methodology is 
							especially acute for those working within the 
							conservative Protestant branch of the Christian 
							community. The typical evangelical way of 
							approaching a moral question is to turn to the Bible 
							for direct citations relevant to the issue at hand. 
							If we want to know what to think about war, 
							marriage, homosexuality, drinking, suicide, or 
							economic ethics, we turn to the Bible for moral 
							commands that address these issues. Millions of 
							evangelicals attempt to direct their steps in 
							precisely this manner.
	Much of the time, when we turn to the Bible in 
							this way we are blessed with all of the insight that 
							we need. We find that the Bible offers more than 
							enough direction about what we must think and do-the 
							problem in such cases is not in knowing 
							God's will, but in reshaping our hearts and habits 
							that we might obey it.
	But the issue is much more complex when it comes 
							to issues that the Bible does not directly address. 
							How are we to discern God's moral will about stem 
							cell research? Or cloning? Or cybernetics? Or the 
							mapping of the human genome? Or gene patenting? 
							These scientific discoveries and technological 
							applications are not-and could not have 
							been-addressed in the Bible because they are new 
							innovations in human life. In such cases, what does 
							it mean to take a biblical perspective on 
							these issues, or to develop biblical moral 
							norms? What should Bible-oriented Christians and 
							Christian scholars do when they run into moral 
							issues that the Bible does not and cannot address 
							with clear moral injunctions?
	This is a question that has occupied the 
							attention of a number of biblical scholars and 
							Christian ethicists in recent decades. An entire 
							sub-literature in these two overlapping fields has 
							developed in order to explore the broad question of 
							how the Bible should be interpreted by Christians in 
							shaping the moral life, and the more narrow issue of 
							how to employ the Scriptures in relation to moral 
							challenges not addressed in Scripture.2 
							As far as I can determine in my review of Christian 
							bioethical literature so far, the "Bible and ethics" 
							discussion of the past 25 years or so remains 
							largely unknown among bioethicists. It is not 
							difficult to understand why this is so, given the 
							difficulty of keeping up with developments within 
							bioethics proper. However, this lack of awareness 
							has perhaps contributed to certain weaknesses in the 
							bioethics offered by evangelical Christians to this 
							point. I have observed the following patterns:
	Some try to retain the reflexive pattern of 
							applying biblical injunctions by appealing to 
							biblical texts that are dubiously interpreted as 
							speaking directly to the issue at hand.
	One example of this tendency is seen with regard 
							to the issue of abortion. It would certainly be a 
							welcome thing if the Bible contained the kind of 
							explicit ban on abortion that is found in the Didache. But alas there is none to be found. 
							Therefore, most evangelicals build an anti-abortion 
							case by citing texts such as Psalm 22: 9-10, 51:5, 
							139:13-16; Jeremiah 1:5; and Luke 1:41-44. These 
							passages celebrate the very origins of life in the 
							womb and acknowledge life as a divine creation. They 
							affirm the awesome goodness of God and God's 
							creation. They indicate that God has a purpose for 
							every human life and makes plans for his people even 
							before they are born. These texts are certainly 
							relevant to abortion; however, they do not address 
							the issue directly, a fact routinely pointed out by 
							those who reject the pro-life position. Working from 
							these citations is probably not the best way to make 
							the case against abortion.3 
							By extension, the problem is all the more acute when 
							Scripture is stretched to apply to issues even more 
							remote from biblical times, such as genetic 
							engineering and cloning.
	Either because the effort to apply biblical texts 
							to issues about which the Bible is silent is deemed 
							not to work, or as a supplement to such efforts, 
							evangelicals sometimes deal with this problem 
	by importing some other way of resolving the 
							moral issue, often without acknowledging having done 
							so. On issues such as abortion or 
							homosexuality, for example, conservative Protestants 
							will sometimes employ the natural law tradition to 
							buttress their biblical claims. This is a rich and 
							fruitful tradition that offers considerable 
							resources for contemporary Christian bioethics. But 
							it is also a complex tradition, which has found its 
							home in the Roman Catholic Church rather than within 
							Protestantism, which historically has tended to view 
							it with suspicion. It is methodologically incoherent 
							to graft the conclusions drawn from Catholic natural 
							law theory into evangelical ethical arguments, 
							especially if stripped of the philosophical, 
							theological, and ecclesiological context within 
							which natural law theory generally functions.4
	But even this move is better than what sometimes 
							occurs. Lacking clear biblical authorities, and 
							abandoning alternative ethical methods, Christians 
							may actually arrive at their positions through 
	gut instinct, political loyalties, 
							self-interest, or some other altogether dubious 
							basis for a Christian moral conviction. 
							We just "know" the right position on an issue 
							because it is the way "our kind of people," or our 
							employers, or our opinion leaders, or our instincts, 
							direct us. Everyone must acknowledge the power of 
							such factors in their decision-making, but we 
							certainly cannot settle for this assortment of 
							factors as an ethical methodology.
							Difficulties with deriving moral norms directly from 
							biblical texts actually reveal a vulnerability in 
							evangelical ethical method that transcends 
							bioethical issues and that has been noticed by 
							observers outside of our tradition for many years. 
							Any Christian moral tradition that hopes to remain 
							at all relevant to contemporary society must devise 
							a way of addressing a whole range of moral issues 
							that the Bible does not directly mention. Lacking 
							such, we are vulnerable to the misuse of Scripture 
							and/or the importation of alien methods, ideologies, 
							or influences to fill the gap. More radically, a 
							failure to find a way to address the gap between 
							"then" and "now" may lead some thoughtful 
							evangelicals to finally reject the validity of a 
							biblically-oriented approach to morality in favor of 
							models drawn from other Christian or non-Christian 
							moral traditions. Rather than creating or exhausting 
							this vulnerability, the field of bioethics has 
							simply revealed it with acute clarity. Thus, to 
							sharpen our approach to bioethical methodology will 
							not only help improve our bioethics but also our 
							general ethical method-and our everyday moral 
							decision-making.
The Turn to Principles and 
							Theological Motifs
	My preliminary survey of substantive bioethical 
							reflection from inside the Christian community (and 
							sometimes from religiously committed thinkers in 
							other faith-traditions) reveals that the 
							methodological challenge I have sketched is being 
							met more adequately through a turn to moral 
							principles and a rendering of broader theological 
							motifs grounded in particular ways of reading 
							central scriptural narratives.
	The lack of direct biblical moral injunctions 
							requires those who are interested in what Scripture 
							says to read the Bible in a different way. Rather 
							than looking for what is not there, scholars are 
							forced back from the moral injunction level to other 
							types of scriptural moral resources. Let me 
							illustrate what I mean by adapting a chart 
							concerning ethical methodology that appears in the 
							book Kingdom Ethics, a book that I 
							co-authored with Glen Stassen of Fuller Seminary. 
							5
	
		
 
	Each human being makes moral judgments regularly. 
							Deciding what I/we should do about X, right now, 
							requires a moral judgment in a particular case or 
							situation. Unless we make all of our moral judgments 
							idiosyncratically, however, particular decisions are 
							usually rooted in some structure of moral norms. 
							Moving one level down to rules, we find one element 
							of this structure. A moral rule is a concrete 
							action-guide that applies not just to one immediate 
							case but to all relevantly similar cases. relevantly 
							similar cases. It tells us concretely what to 
							do or not to do. "You shall not lie." "You shall not 
							commit adultery." "You shall not murder." One 
							increasingly pressing need in the bioethics 
							community is to discern whether moral rules related 
							to biotechnology can be developed. If so, we will 
							then have a basis for judgments that we should make 
							about particular biotech applications in individual 
							life or in society.6
	But rules themselves are not freestanding. While 
							legalists often function as if rules provide their 
							own warrant, underneath sound moral rules are 
							broader moral principles. Though the distinction 
							between rules and principles is not always easy to 
							draw, principles are one level more general and 
							deeper than rules: they do not tell us concretely 
							and specifically what to do. They provide a basis 
							for the rules that we do develop, and any 
							well-founded rule spells out direct applications of 
							more general principles. So the rule against 
							lying to a patient is grounded in principles such as 
							respect for persons, for patient autonomy, and for 
							truthfulness itself. Rules against adultery are 
							grounded in respect for marital covenants and for 
							the sanctity of the institution of the family. Rules 
							against killing are grounded in respect for human 
							life and bodily integrity, among other principles.
	There is yet a deeper level, which I refer to as 
							the "basic convictions" level. It is quite popular 
							in evangelical circles today to label this the 
							"worldview" level. Whatever it is called, it has to 
							do with our most fundamental beliefs about ultimate 
							matters and/or our fundamental basis for making 
							moral decisions. When framed theologically, these 
							are the answers we give to such fundamental 
							questions as where we come from, who we are, what is 
							wrong with us, how what is wrong can be addressed 
							(if it can), and where we and the world are going. 
							In other words, here we have doctrines of creation, 
							humanity, sin, salvation, ethics, and eschatology. 
							General ethical theories include utilitarianism, 
							Kantian deontology, virtue theory, natural law 
							theory, and others. Sometimes such theories have 
							themselves been explicitly grounded in some kind of 
							theological approach; other times they have been 
							presented on a stand-alone basis.
	If it is possible to identify a rock-bottom 
							foundation for all moral reasoning, it is found 
							here. To the extent that moral rules and principles 
							are rationally grounded and coherently related to 
							one's life and worldview, they seem to work in the 
							way I am outlining. Basic worldview/theological 
							convictions or general ethical theories generate key 
							moral principles, which then lead to concrete moral 
							rules, and finally to judgments in immediate 
							situations and particular cases. Or, working with 
							the same model but from the other direction, one 
							could say that particular judgments can reveal a 
							person's functioning moral rules. These rules, when 
							examined, often give evidence of a set of principles 
							that undergird them.7 
							And these principles are ultimately grounded in a 
							person's foundational convictions or worldview, 
							whether consciously articulated or not.
	The Bible itself gives evidence of this 
							four-level structure of moral norms. It contains 
							numerous particular judgments, often embedded in 
							historical narratives or commentary upon them. It 
							offers a raft of moral commands and rules of varying 
							strength, most frequently in Old Testament legal 
							materials but in the New Testament as well. Sifting 
							through these moral rules and commands, one can 
							sometimes find statements of overarching moral 
							principles, such as justice and neighbor-love (cf. 
							Mt. 22:36-40). And in the scriptures, all moral 
							norms for God's people are ultimately grounded in 
							the character and will of a good and sovereign God.
	The task I set for myself in this paper was to 
							begin to discover how Christians (especially 
							evangelical or "biblical" Christians) should go 
							about discerning reliable answers to the moral 
							questions raised by biotechnology, by offering a 
							preliminary analysis of patterns of ethical 
							methodology among Christians weighing in on 
							contemporary biotechnology debates. I find that 
							while some Christians are attempting the impossible 
							by "applying" biblical moral injunctions to 
							contemporary issues not addressed by them, more 
							sophisticated thinkers are doing what must be done 
							if one would bring an ancient sacred text to bear on 
							brand-new moral problems: pushing deeper to the 
							level of moral principle, and beyond that to 
							foundational biblical motifs that for centuries have 
							shaped the way believers understand God, the world, 
							and the human condition. The ultimate kinds of 
							questions and challenges humanity is facing today 
							are perhaps inevitably evoking in biblically 
							literate scholars a return to Christianity's 
							ultimate primordial texts. It is perhaps, then, not 
							such a disadvantage that biotechnology issues cannot 
							be found in any biblical lexicon or word study book, 
							as this silence forces us back to a profound 
							wrestling with the most fundamental moral and 
							theological affirmations of biblical faith. 
	
	NOTES 
	1 A 
							point very nicely made by Nigel Cameron early in the 
							development of a renewed Christian bioethics. See
							"The Christian Stake in 
							Bioethics," in John F. Kilner et al. 
							eds., Bioethics and the Future of Medicine 
							(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), ch. 1. 
	2 Some 
							of the key works, in the order of their publication: 
							David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in 
							Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress 
							Press, 1975); Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use of 
							the Bible in Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: 
							Fortress Press, 1983); Robert K. Johnston, ed.,
							The Use of the Bible in Theology: Evangelical 
							Options (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985); 
							Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen, Bible 
							and Ethics in the Christian Life, rev. ed. 
							(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989); Stephen E. 
							Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in 
							Communion: Scripture and Ethics in Christian Life 
							(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991); Luke Timothy 
							Johnson, Scripture and Discernment: Decision 
							Making in the Church (Nashville: Abingdon, 
							1996); Jeffrey S. Siker, Scripture and Ethics: 
							Twentieth Century Portraits (New York and 
							Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Paul 
							Jersild, Spirit Ethics: Scripture and the 
							Moral Life (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000)-here 
							the author includes a chapter on genetic ethics to 
							test his method; Charles H. Cosgrove, Appealing to Scripture in Moral Debate: Five 
							Hermeneutical Rules (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
							2002). 
	3 This 
							claim is explored further, and (we hope) a sound 
							biblical argument against abortion offered, in Glen 
							H. Stassen and David P. Gushee, Kingdom 
							Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context 
							(Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2003), ch. 
							10. For a somewhat different view, see Francis J. 
							Beckwith, Politically Correct Death: Answering 
							Arguments for Abortion Rights (Grand Rapids: 
							Baker, 1993). 
	4 I am 
							not claiming that Protestants cannot employ natural 
							law theory with theological/ethical integrity, or 
							that it is an approach that somehow belongs to the 
							Catholic tradition alone. Catholics themselves make 
							no such claim. My argument is simply that 
							evangelical Protestants, in particular, tend to be 
							unschooled in natural law theory and therefore must 
							be cautious in importing its conclusions-especially 
							if they are unwilling to accept its premises. For a 
							broad discussion and defense of natural law, see J. 
							Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case 
							for Natural Law (Downers Grove: Intervarsity 
							Press, 1997). 
	5 Kingdom Ethics, ch. 5. 
	
	6 
							Beauchamp and Childress rightly point out that such 
							rules take a variety of forms: they can be 
							substantive, authority, or procedure rules 
							(Principles, pp. 13-14). They can also specify 
							standard and accepted practices that embody any or 
							all of these types of moral rules. 
	7"Inductivist" 
							moral theorists argue that judgments in particular 
							cases do not reveal already functioning moral rules 
							and broader principles, but instead that such rules 
							and principles are actually derivative 
							generalizations from insights gained in struggling 
							with particularly important cases. See Principles, pp. 391-397. While I believe that 
							both sources of moral insight are significant, I am 
							unwilling to weaken the role of actual principles 
							and rules too much, either at a normative level or a 
							metaethical one. 
	
	Copyright 2003 by The Center 
							for Bioethics and Human Dignity
	The contents of this article do 
							not necessarily reflect the opinions of CBHD, its 
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